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We very often praise individual works of literature, poetry, or film for yielding insight 
into something important, works of visual art for showing us new ways to see their 
subjects, or conceptual artworks for challenging unconsidered assumptions. What’s 
more, when doling out praise like this, we mean to praise the works as art. The artis-
tic value of Duchamp’s Fountain must be related to the value of its cognitive effects 
on the beholder – a provocative statement about art presented for consideration, 
an attitude expressed toward convention – and not just the way in which it creates 
those effects. Any assessment of the artistic value of Kafka’s work that leaves out his 
attitudes toward bureaucracy and alienation, and the importance and value of those 
attitudes, is woefully incomplete. The point here is that an artwork’s cognitive virtues 
seem to bear on its goodness as art. The project of this paper is to give an account of 
this relationship between cognitive and artistic value: which cognitive values count 
toward artistic value, and when?
By the cognitive values of a work, I mean contributions of that work to the viewer’s 
understanding of anything and everything, whether these work directly or indirect-
ly, immediately or slowly. Thus ideas, facts, phrases, thematic contents, exemplars, 
and so on can be cognitive values so long as they have some cognitive use. By an 
artwork’s artistic value, I mean how much that work is valued, or held good, as art. 
The parallel between these terms, and the cases mentioned above, invites a quick 
answer: the greater a work’s total cognitive value, the better it is as art! But this can-
not be right. First, we never take the historical or scientific facts contained in a novel, 
for example, to contribute to its artistic value, though these are certainly cognitive 
values. We will need to be more careful than this about which cognitive values carry 
artistic value. Second, such a view also seems to commit us to saying that artworks 
are worse (artistically) if they have cognitive disvalue. But this runs afoul of common 
practice more often than not. Shakespeare’s plays are not made worse no matter how 
many times they reference the mistaken medical and scientific theories of the day, 
nor does one see an artistic flaw in the Odyssey because it advocates a view of justice 
with which one disagrees. Therefore, in giving an alternate account, we should be 
careful about what undesired sorts of artistic flaws we are letting in along with our 
cognitive-artistic virtues.
The account I endorse addresses these problems by holding that the cognitive-artis-
tic value of a work depends not on the propositional content the work contains, but 
on the cognitive tools that beholding the work affords us. Contra many artistic cog-
nitivists, it seems to me that we do not value artworks because they give us knowl-
edge, which is argued in section 1. To give an alternative to factual cognitive values, I 
borrow Elgin’s notion of reconfigurations, but argue in section 2 for a less pragmatic 
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stance than Elgin, so as to avoid the second problem described above. In section 3 I 
give an intentional account of when cognitive values count for artistic value, and how 
much. Finally, section 4 addresses some loose ends and objections to the view.
1. Problems with Truth-Oriented Cognitivism
Peter Lamarque has sharply criticized views that make truth an artistic value; I mostly 
concur with his criticisms.1 These cognitivist views range from the very strong – “Truth 
is always a virtue and falsehood always a vice,” as per Rowe quoted by Lamarque 
(138) – to the moderate, such as those which revise the meaning of “truth” away from 
propositional truth (Lamarque 129). Lamarque’s choicest arguments are for those 
who hold truth proper to be an artistic value; this, he says, is the “high ground” of 
cognitivism. Focusing on literature, his first line of attack is that “it is not part of liter-
ary appreciation to pursue debates about the extraliterary truth of literary themes” 
(134). He illustrates this point (which he says is meant both descriptively and norma-
tively) with an argument worth reproducing about Keats’ “Ode on a Grecian Urn”:
1. There is near universal agreement that the ode “On a Grecian Urn” is one of 
the finest poems in the English language.
2. There is no general agreement about the truth of the line “Beauty is truth, 
truth beauty”… therefore:
3. The literary value of the poem cannot reside, even in part, in the literal truth 
of its most famous line (Lamarque 136).
This general strategy is forceful – and looks decisive against the more extreme ver-
sions of truth-oriented cognitivism – yet in tension with the fact that we very often 
speak about literature as saying something, containing insight, or otherwise teach-
ing us. Lamarque wants to resolve this tension by admitting these things as values, 
but not literary values. His treatment of literary theme gives him an opening: themes, 
though commonly taken as containing a work’s cognitive virtues, are really just 
“organizing principles” for the work (136). Sometimes themes cannot be stated as 
propositions at all; some that can, cannot be assessed for truth; for those with truth-
conditions he has ready similar lines of argument to the one above about “Grecian 
Urn.” I endorse these anti-cognitivist arguments, but not the sophisticated formalism 
1  Lamarque, P., “Cognitive Values in the Arts: Marking the Boundaries,” in Contemporary Debates in 
Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art, Matthew Kieran, ed. (Blackwell Publishing: Oxford, 2006), 127-
139.
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Lamarque apparently takes them to lead to: “In the end what matters … is not the 
themes themselves … but their relation to the particularities on display” (139).2 
Recalling the case of Kafka, this is where I think we should get off the sophisticated 
formalist bus. How can we vindicate the belief that a great part of Kafka’s artistic 
merit is to have communicated to us a useful and valuable way of conceiving the indi-
vidual’s relationship to society – and not just how he articulates that theme – if we are 
committed to thinking the theme itself is not what matters? I think we ought to take 
an intermediate path between truth-oriented cognitivism and sophisticated formal-
ism: a cognitivism which emphasizes cognitive enrichment over knowledge-transfer.
2. Elgin and Cognitive Tools
To say what exactly this “cognitive enrichment” consists in, I will borrow from Catha-
rine Elgin’s “Art in the Advancement of the Understanding.”3 Elgin starts by consider-
ing cognitive progress, of which the dominant view, she says, is a sort of fact-gath-
ering model: that we advance understanding by learning new information. But, she 
points out, this misses progress by reconfiguration: “Reorganizing a domain so that 
hitherto overlooked or underemphasized features, patterns, opportunities, and re-
sources come to light” (1). The rest of her project is to describe reconfigurations as 
they function in the arts, with the aim of showing how art operates “at the cutting 
edge of inquiry,” apparently playing an important role for all sorts of cognitive pur-
suits (12). I want to draw on her examples of reconfiguration, leaving aside for the 
moment claims about whatever instrumental role art might have in inquiry in gen-
eral.
Here are some of Elgin’s examples:
By painting a picture of [Gertrude] Stein that highlights certain hitherto 
2  I don’t want to misrepresent Lamarque: it is possible he will countenance such a feeling. He gives 
a few suggestive phrases in his (2006), such as acknowledging that literary works can provide “fresh 
perspectives” on old themes (139). But he does not say if this counts toward artistic or literary value, 
and judging by his (2010), he will want to reject cognitive uses for art as artistic virtues. In case his 
view, as elucidated elsewhere, really does allow for valuable themes to enhance artistic value, let’s 
instead speak of a generic sophisticated formalist, who takes themes as only organizing principles 
and concerns herself only with how those themes are realized. See Lamarque, P., “The Uselessness of 
Art,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 68(3), 2010, 214. 
3  Elgin, C., “Art in the Advancement of Understanding,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 39(1), 2002, 
1-12. 
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unnoticed or underemphasized features, Picasso enables us to see her 
differently … To call [a bribe] a cancer is to classify the act as not just 
objectionable in itself, but as a source of endless corruption with the potential 
to destroy the political institutions it affects … Painters like Courbet and 
writers like Balzac shift our gaze, showing how portrayals of people whom 
‘high art’ had ignored yield a more richly textured understanding of the 
human condition. (Elgin, 2-7)
What we can take from Elgin is a picture on which art enriches us cognitively by show-
ing us exemplars, patterns, attitudes, and so forth, all of which we can then use as 
tools for thought by reconceptualizing, juxtaposing, comparing, recalling, and so on. 
Though not new facts, reconfigurations like these are rightly called cognitive values 
because they are useful tools for the productive operation of our cognitive faculties. 
Further, it can hardly be denied that they are afforded by artworks. To return to the 
case of the cognitive value of Kafka’s work: some of it, we have said, resides in the 
attitude toward the individual and society which he forwards. The emphasis on bu-
reaucracy, the surreal and inexplicable impositions on the individual, and the indi-
vidual’s isolation together form a cognitively useful rubric. We do not have to adopt it 
across the board, or even adopt it at all, for it to help us recognize and classify situa-
tions, consider social questions, or interrogate our own assumptions. The very word 
“Kafkaesque” is proof that we use Kafka’s outlook as a cognitive tool or shortcut.4
Duchamp’s Fountain operates by a different sort of reconfigurative technique. Its cog-
nitive value seems to lie in the reconceptualization of art which it suggests: art is not 
sacred or beautiful, the artist is not foremost a creator, “ready-mades” can be art, 
and so on. Notice that I have summarized these cognitive values as propositions, 
despite arguing against a propositional account of cognitive value in section 1. This 
is an opportunity to make an important point. Though the cognitive-artistic value of 
art cannot be propositional, this does not mean artworks do not or should not try 
to state propositions. The propositional content of Fountain, however, serves not to 
add to our store of true propositions, but rather to provoke thought and, by exem-
plifying the point of its propositions, to serve as an example that is useful in thinking 
about art. We note what Fountain says, and later use it as a tool for reflection, a tool 
for destabilizing and opposing more traditional assumptions about art, or a foil to 
the Romantic poets’ view of art in our debates with ourselves. Thus the cognitive 
value of the work operates by reconfiguration, not propositionally; that is, it has uses 
4  This point is from Goodman by way of Davies, D., “Learning Through Fictional Narratives in Art and 
Science” in Beyond Mimesis and Convention, Frigg, R., and Roman, M., eds (Springer: 2010), 51-69.
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regardless of whether it is endorsed or rejected.
Classic works of literature that are taken to afford insight into deep truths about hu-
man nature are perhaps the paradigm case of learning from art, so let’s consider Anna 
Karenina. As with in Fountain, the common notion that by reading such a work we 
find out something profound (and true) seems to demand a propositional account. 
But this is a simplified description of a process which fits far better under Elgin’s con-
ceptual scheme. First, ask: how could such literature afford us knowledge? We must 
admit that it cannot support or confirm our beliefs in the propositions we take it to 
advocate, except to the smallest degree. It is, after all, fiction, and in many cases has 
been “gerrymandered” to illustrate these propositions!5 It cannot be that Anna Kar-
enina gives us reason to believe the things which it is saying, even if we could identify 
those things. Instead, it must be that the novel suggests points for consideration: 
ways of thinking about love, ways of thinking about meaning in life. But why stop 
at hypotheses? The cognitive value of great novels lies in their cognitive fertility and 
usefulness: their narrative and descriptive elements suggest attitude which we our-
selves can adopt or discard, our insight into their characters’ thoughts is useful in 
reflecting on ourselves, and their thematic organization suggests patterns which we 
can apply to experience. All these things, being cognitive values which operate non-
propositionally, I bring under the heading of “reconfigurations,” or “cognitive tools.”
Here is where I want to differ from Elgin and Goodman. They mean to make the more 
pragmatic point that art, being a way of “worldmaking,” has a role in cognitive prog-
ress on a par with science.6 Thus a proposed reconfiguration will be valuable only so 
long as it really does move us forward, and perhaps pointless if we do not adopt it. A 
metaphor for this view: if the conceptual landscape in need of organizing is my living 
room furniture, then some reconfigurations are good for my purposes of comfort and 
utility, some are neutral, and some, like putting the chairs in the fireplace and flip-
ping the tables upside-down, are just bad.7 Art advances understanding by proposing 
improvements to our conceptual landscapes. I would rather use the metaphor of a 
toolbox. Every reconfigurative cognitive value is added to the toolbox, to be used 
when appropriate. Some tools are better for some problems, some are more useful 
5  This is Stolnitz’s “no-evidence” argument, as presented in Davies, “Learning Through Fictional 
Narratives,” 59-60.
6  See Elgin: art “leads us into terra incognita,” in “Art in the Advancement of Understanding,” 12. 
Also Goodman, N., Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978). (I make this claim about 
Goodman’s intent based on personal correspondence with D. Davies, 5/31/17.)
7  This metaphor also due to D. Davies, 5/31/17.
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overall than others, and all can be misused to ill effect or even harm. This metaphor 
better captures three properties of cognitive values in art. First, reconfigurations in 
art are almost never so thoroughgoing as to redraw entire conceptual frameworks. 
Second, we are able to switch among ways of seeing fairly easily and consciously. 
Third, there is no such thing as a purely harmful reconfiguration, just as no tool is 
bad except as it is used inadvertently, to hammer a thumb or splinter a two-by-four. 
Even more so with cognitive tools: perhaps we are never done any good by adopting 
Céline’s conceptual schema in Journey to the End of the Night, which would have us 
believing that “love does not exist,”8 it is still valuable as an object of fruitful con-
sideration. We can put it up against our own view, for example, and perhaps make 
some cognitive gains. What’s more, only very confused conceptual schemes indeed 
contain no kernel of cognitive usefulness whatsoever.
3. Intended and Unintended Cognitive Values
I have argued that there is a class of cognitive values – reconfigurations – which are 
valued for how they enrich our cognitive repertoire and that these cognitive tools are 
the cognitive values commonly taken bear on a work’s artistic value, not any proposi-
tional content it may be thought to have. Put another way, an artwork is better to the 
extent it enriches our cognition. But this is not yet the whole picture; for one thing, 
we ought to take intention into account. The role of intention is a puzzle. On the one 
hand, it seems misguided to praise a work for yielding unintended cognitive value, 
whether via unintended features or interpretations.9 But on the other hand, we can 
hardly require that the artist anticipate all the responses to and cognitive uses of her 
work before its affordance of them counts toward its artistic value. What to do? I sug-
gest an answer based on the concept of cognitive fruitfulness.
We need to be able to say where in a work the cognitively valuable aspects are lo-
cated, so let’s suppose, with Goodman, that artworks function as hierarchically or-
8  Putnam’s example, quoted in D. Davies, “Learning Through Fictional Narratives” (58).
9  Regarding unintended features, I mean: maybe the spreading cracks in the Mona Lisa provoke 
me into profound meditations about mortality. This is cognitively valuable as a metaphor which 
says that even venerated things fall apart, but hardly makes the painting a better artwork. As for 
unintended interpretations, consider D. Davies’ criticism of Ellis’s interpretation of Hirst’s Physical 
Impossibility of Death. Ellis takes the piece as exemplifying “masculine vitality,” counter to Hirst’s 
apparent intentions given the title and other details of the work – she has taken it to be a symbol 
which it is not, and so is wrong to praise the work for the cognitive value of that symbol. See Davies, 
D., “Telling Pictures: The Place of Narrative in Late Modern ‘Visual Art’,” in Peter Goldie & Elisabeth 
Schellekens, eds., Philosophy and Conceptual Art (Oxford University Press), 144-145.
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ganized systems of symbols.10 Some of these symbols are cognitively fruitful: they 
have the potential be useful cognitive tools, or to be rewarding when approached 
cognitively. Some of these symbols are intended for a cognitive approach or use. The 
proposal is that only those symbols intended for a cognitive approach count toward 
the work’s artistic value, and that the more fruitful they are, the more they count. Note 
that because on this view symbols can be intended for cognitive use without being 
fruitful, and the converse, we can also make sense of symbols failing to perform their 
intended functions as cognitive tools.
Let’s illustrate this with Fountain again. It seems safe to suppose that while Duchamp 
intended us to think about the artist as creator (or not), he did not intend us to think 
about the beauty of manufactured and quotidian objects. Either way of using Foun-
tain as a cognitive tool is quite possibly fruitful, but since only the first was intended, 
only the first adds to the work’s cognitive value. Those who praise it for cognitive 
value derived from the second way, this view says, are mistaken. Moreover, the view 
also commits us to saying that the artistic-cognitive value of Fountain has to do not 
with the importance or profundity of “what it says,” but the fact that the relevant 
symbol – the performative act of claiming a urinal as art – has proved very cognitively 
useful, and likely in ways that Duchamp never considered.11 I think these conclusions 
are exactly what we should want from an account of artistic-cognitive values. To re-
turn to the tool metaphor: the work furnishes us with a symbol to be used as a tool 
for cognitive ends, and we, in turn, praise the work in proportion to the usefulness of 
that tool.
4. Objections and Loose Ends
It might be objected that we have let in too many instances of cognitive value. 
Shouldn’t we, for example, explicitly exclude those cognitive values that are uncon-
nected with the “point” of an artwork? I don’t think so. If these do not contribute to 
artistic value, it is because of a broader preference for unity which influences evalu-
ation of the noncognitive aspects of art as well. Aren’t there some topics of which 
treating fruitfully is never artistically valuable? Again, no, but there are topics with 
which artists are not usually concerned, and topics which are less friendly to rich re-
10  In the case of literature, this hierarchy of symbols could roughly be: words, then imagery, then 
characters and plot events, then themes, and finally the work as a whole.
11  Here is an interesting consequence. It is common critical practice to report on what sort of 
reflections a work seems to demand. On this view, we can interpret such reports as functioning as a 
kind of evidence that the work’s cognitively relevant symbols are indeed fruitful.
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configurative cognitive progress. Simple mathematics and science are hardly open 
to reconfiguration, and reconfiguration in advanced mathematics and science (con-
tra Elgin) is more effectively carried out within those disciplines than by the vague, 
indistinct, and non-propositional methods of art. Contrast these areas with inquiry 
relating to “the human condition” or general moral truths: everybody has abundant 
cognitive material concerning these which supports reconfiguration, and is person-
ally invested in such questions to boot. It is no wonder that these topics are more 
strongly associated with art’s cognitive value.
Let me address two more loose ends. I said at the beginning of this paper that there 
was a problem involving cognitive disvalue. Specifically, we sometimes do not want 
to say that cognitive disvalues are flaws of artworks, and we certainly do not want 
the result that we must think less of an artwork if we disagree with something we 
take it to say. A virtue of the cognitive tool account is that it banishes a work’s propo-
sitional content as irrelevant, thus avoiding the problem. So if not falsehoods, what 
kind of cognitive features of a work can diminish its artistic value? The answer falls 
out naturally: a work is worse if it fails to be cognitively fruitful where it is intended 
to be. This principle is the ground of many common criticisms; to say a work is (the-
matically) trite, shallow, banal, or uninteresting is to comment that its relevant parts 
have failed to be fruitful, with a background assumption being that at least a work’s 
themes are generally hoped by the artist to be edifying or useful. Lastly, I have used 
the notion of fruitfulness as though it is a simple one, but really it is not. However, 
to judge the fruitfulness of a cognitive tool, we must have some way of valuing its 
products. While there is agreement on how to do this in many cases – that is, we are 
likely to agree on what is profound, important, interesting, stimulating, and so on 
– there is at least room for disagreement. I think this is room we should leave open; 
it is one source of subjectivity that helps to explain the disagreement over artistic-
cognitive value that we sometimes observe (though a larger source is the difficulty 
of discerning the artist’s intentions so as to glean the correct cognitive tool from the 
work).
I will finish by returning to the motivation for this account. We wanted a way of vin-
dicating, against various sorts of formalist views, the common belief that art teach-
es us (and that this is proper to a value it has as art!) without the problems which 
accompany truth-oriented cognitivism. We found a candidate mechanism by which 
this happens in Elgin’s “reconfigurations,” but reimagined these as tools which en-
rich thought. The last piece of the argument was to show how the artist’s intention 
makes such cognitive tools relevant to artistic value. The upshot of all this, I think, 
is that art has (among other projects) a fundamentally cognitive project: cognitive 
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aims and methods that are proper to it, and a particular mode of artistic-cognitive 
evaluation that bears, sometimes strongly, upon its value as art.
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